



A shift to the right: A shift to a new *modus operandi*?

APCO Worldwide's analysis of the European Parliament elections and prospects for the 7th legislature

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Executive Summary

The 7th European Parliament elections marked a significant shift to the right as the European People's Party (EPP) comfortably out-performed its traditional centre-left rival, the Party of European Socialists (PES). Perhaps unexpectedly, European voters tended to reward incumbent centre-right governments for their handling of the economic crisis, while punishing social democrats in governments and coalition partnerships. The rightward shift was reinforced by a strengthened mainstream eurosceptic/free-market vote as well as gains for the far-right in 10 Member States. Significantly, the political organisation of the Parliament means a diverse set of far-right parties are very unlikely to coalesce into a political group that would enjoy the benefits of Parliamentary offices and Secretariat support. The Greens, in tune with greater public concern over climate change, gained significantly on their position in the previous Parliament. The Liberals (ALDE) retreated slightly as did the far-left. The anti-EU forces remained static overall, despite the spectacular performance of some parties like UKIP, which truly upset the established political order in the United Kingdom.

The EPP does not enjoy an outright majority, and formal and informal coalitions will remain the *modus operandi* of the Parliament. The defining feature of the new Parliament and its coalition-forming will be the greater influence of the EPP relative to the PES. Yet the Parliament's final shape and complexion is not yet clear, and two critical unknowns could still impact this central balance of power. The first is the destination of the Italian Partito Democratico (PD), who will choose between PES or ALDE. The second is the formation of a successor to the mainstream right-wing grouping of the Union of European Nations (UEN) from the UK Conservatives and the Czech Civic Democrats, together with members from five other Member States.

In practice, although freer to choose in its more influential pivotal position, the EPP is still likely to look to the PES, ALDE and the new mainstream right-wing grouping to form issue-by-issue coalitions, while the traditional carve-up of the Parliament's key offices may see an EPP-ALDE-UEN successor deal or a reversion to the traditional EPP-PES 5-year deal. The D'Hondt system will in any case reward the EPP with numerically more Committee Chairs relative to the PES than in the last Parliament – and on slightly more politically influential or prized Committees.


Overall, business can broadly expect a continuation of the Parliament's regulatory behaviour from the last Parliament. The reinforced mainstream right may provide a slightly stronger bulwark against the more regulatory and socially protective tendencies of the centre-left, particularly in the current economic environment, but the Parliament's position as friend of the environment/consumer is likely to continue. The eventual political alignment between the incoming Commission president, widely assumed to be José Manuel Barroso for a second term, and the Parliamentary coalition that backs him, may well go some way to determine whether the 7th legislature is more social market or social democrat-oriented. A right-leaning coalition would probably see Barroso steer a similar political course. A deal to secure PES support for Barroso's re-selection would likely see him steer a more socially-oriented course as the Socialists have increasingly agitated for over the last few years.

Turnout

No commentary on a European Parliament election is complete without some reference to the voter turnout. It continued its downward trend over successive legislatures since 1979 to reach 43.1 percent in 2009. This was down from 44 percent based on the EU27 when the Bulgarian and Romanian elections during the course of the last legislative term are included. Therefore, the drop in real terms is fairly limited and has defied the worst predictions, but the headline is, of course, that nearly 60 percent of Europe's 375 million eligible voters opted not to vote. This comes at a time when the European Parliament under the Lisbon Treaty could assume full co-legislative powers on around 80 percent of the EU's legislative and other decision-making areas. The paradox remains unresolved: the increasingly powerful Parliament becomes less relevant to, and more distant from, its citizens at each successive election.

Yet the major political parties, rather than the system itself, are perhaps most to blame: they elected to fight campaigns on largely national platforms to produce 27 national campaigns and little European campaigning. For the most part, these parties opted not to address the key policy issues (e.g., climate change, energy policy) that the Parliament will focus on over the next five years, except where there was an obvious national-European overlap. Notable exceptions, like the French Greens which ran a 9-month campaign on an avowedly European platform and the current Consumer Protection Commissioner Meglena Kuneva's successful campaign for the National Movement for Stability and Progress (NDSV) in Bulgaria, which was credited with driving greater national turn-out, proved that a *bona fide* European platform can bring electoral success.

The big winners and the big losers



In assessing the winners and losers it is important to note that the overall number of seats in the Parliament was reduced from 785 to 736 under the provisions of the Nice Treaty.¹ In other words, an overall increase in seats represents a proportionately greater electoral success in this Parliament, while, conversely, a decrease may in part be explained by the overall reduction of available seats. Summarising, the election was characterised by:

- Significant losses by the Socialists
- Significant gains by the centre-right
- Gains by the Greens
- Gains by the extreme right
- Static vote share for anti-European parties
- Losses by the Liberals and extreme left
- A 10 percent loss of vote share by governing parties across the EU27
- An 80/20 percent share of the vote between parties that support working within the EU system against those that oppose it

The EPP-ED emerged as the overall winner and consolidated its place as the leading group in the Parliament. The EPP picked up some 35.9 percent of the overall vote, compared to the PES's 22 percent. Compared to the last Parliament, the EPP's share shrunk by just 0.8 percent overall, while the PES's suffered an overall decline of 5.6 percent. This was despite the pre-announced departure from the EPP-ED of the UK Conservatives and the Czech Civic Forum to form a new mainstream centre-right eurosceptic group, which makes the outcome all the more remarkable.

The EPP has ridden out the current economic storm in significantly better shape than the PES. Translated into seats the EPP is likely to have 264 and the PES at present has 161, compared to 278 and 214 respectively in the last Parliament. However, the PES Group could be buoyed by some 22 extra seats to reach 183 in total, if the Italian Partito Democratico (PD) elects to sit with them as opposed to with the ALDE Group. This would make the numerical gap between the two largest Groups 79 seats in the new Parliament, compared to 64 seats in the last.

Incumbent centre-right governments fared well in Germany, France, Italy and Poland. In Spain, the opposition PP outscored the governing Socialists, albeit in a close result. In other words, in five of the six largest Member States (i.e., with the most EP seats at stake), the parties that will form the core of the EPP in the 7th legislature triumphed. In Hungary the centre-right Fidesz-KDNP party outscored its centre-left opponents by a remarkable 40 percentage points, securing 15 out of the 22 available seats and boosting the EPP relative to the PES. Only in Greece

¹ The size of the Parliament will increase again if the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force. The increased number will be 754 (with the intention to make the change in the course of 2010) following a political agreement among Member States in December 2008, when the Treaty of Lisbon originally foresaw 751.

did the incumbent ND fare particularly badly against the Socialist PASOK party as a result of several months of social unrest and corruption scandals.

What explains the EPP's success? It seems almost counter-intuitive that the centre-right should triumph in an economic environment where job security and social protection should feature highest among citizens concerns and the "free market" and light regulation is widely blamed for the economic crisis. In truth, most of the major centre-right parties are of the "social market" variant and have carefully positioned themselves away from the "Anglo-Saxon" free-market model that they blame for the crisis. Competence in economic management seems to have swayed voters, as does the absence of a compelling alternative Socialist platform that distinguished it from the centre-right. It is striking that in "grand coalition" governments in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, voters punished the centre-left coalition partners and backed the Christian Democrats. Some may view that the centre-right borrowed the clothes of the Socialists with a form of "compassionate" social market conservatism that seemed more in tune with the electorate than an ill-defined alternative.

Numerically, the PES suffered from very heavy defeats in key Member States, notably in the UK and France. The UK Labour Party with just over 15 percent of the vote came in third place and suffered its lowest ever national election score since its foundation as a modern political party in the 1920s. The French Socialists, still reeling from leadership tensions, scraped past the Greens in second place but with a very modest 16.4 percent of the vote. The Portuguese governing party shed some 18 percent of its vote and was overtaken by the centre-right party of Commission President Barroso. The Spanish Socialists suffered less than might have been expected in a very severe recession, trailing the PP by just 2.7 percentage points. In these four member states the PES group lost a total of 31 seats.

The Slovak SMER party was the sole incumbent centre-left government to buck the overall trend. That was rare good news in a political family riven by national political divisions and suffering from a lack of overall leadership and compelling personalities at the European level. This in turn explains the apparent lower turnout of centre-left voters relative to those of the centre-right. Their inability to agree a competing centre-left candidate to Mr. Barroso is indicative of their leadership deficit and lack of political cohesiveness. The forthcoming German and UK general elections could see their centre-left governments lose power and a decisive centre-right influence in the large Member States in the Council.

The other winners and losers

Impressively, the Green Group (Greens/European Free Alliance) grew its representation in the Parliament from 42 to 53 Members in a smaller Parliament. Nationally, they scored notable gains in France, where their close third position sees their Parliamentary seat allocation jump from six to 14. This will make them the joint largest national delegation with Germany, where the Green vote also grew. Increased shares of the vote saw the Greens win an extra seat in Belgium,

although in the UK the large increase in green votes was not sufficient to secure an extra seat beyond the five (including three nationalists) they already had. There is little doubt that one of the few transnational European political figures, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, was instrumental in the success of “Europe écologie,” while the overall resonance of climate change issues, notably among young voters, has never been higher. Cohn-Bendit, who previously stood as a German MEP, will likely continue to be one of the leading personalities in the new Parliament.

In a parliament that shifted to the right overall, the far-right score marked successes in the Netherlands, the UK (where it won its first-ever national seats), Hungary and through the Northern Leagues in Italy, who doubled their share of vote. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece and Romania also saw increased shares of the vote for nationalist and anti-immigration parties. Yet, it seems unlikely that these often diverse and divergent parties will coalesce into a single political bloc in a Parliament that bestows political advantage and resources on formal Political Groups that must be formed by 27 Members from at least seven Member States.

The Liberals (ALDE Group) retreated from 100 MEPs to 80, and their overall share of vote across the Union was down by 1.7 percent. However, ALDE could exceed its number of MEPs in the last Parliament if the Italian PD’s 22-strong contingent joins them, becoming the largest national delegation in that group. This would transform ALDE from marginal “losers” in the election into winners. In either scenario, the ALDE remain the Parliament’s “third force” and are likely to continue to play a significant role in the political brokering that will decide the Parliament’s key office-holders and the re-appointment of likely Commission President-designate Barroso. ALDE’s overall fortunes were shaped by a strong showing by the German FDP and the liberals in the Netherlands and Belgium. The UK Liberal Democrats trailed in fourth place nationally, while Francois Bayrou’s MoDem suffered badly at the hands of Daniel Cohn-Bendit and his Europe écologie.

Anti-EU parties overall were left treading water, despite some notable gains in certain member states. UKIP’s spectacular success in the UK, where they came in second to the equally eurosceptic Conservatives and gained a further seat, demonstrated the advantages of a strong (anti-) European message and articulate leader in Nigel Farage who is likely to be the dominant force in the Independence and Democracy grouping in the new Parliament. The Danish anti-European party “Danski Folkeparti” was virtually wiped out. Meanwhile, Libertas, leading an anti-Lisbon Treaty campaign but with a muddle of eurosceptic and federalist candidates, notably failed to turn itself into a new pan-European standard-bearer for opponents to the Treaty. Declan Ganley, the face of the Irish “no” in the first Lisbon referendum, did not win a seat, and the indications are that the “yes” camp, as the polls have suggested, are now well-placed to win the second referendum which is expected in October.

Neither winning, nor losing...yet

David Cameron's first pledge on becoming leader of the UK Conservatives (Tories) in December 2005 was to pull his European delegation out of the EPP-ED on the basis that it was too "federalist." True to this, the Tories confirmed this stance prior to this election and pledged to form a new mainstream eurosceptic right-wing party to replace the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) Group. They also confirmed their intention to align with the Czech Civic Democrats (ODS). Together, this already gives the Tories 34 Members, with 25 the required threshold to form a Group. However, under the new rules for Group formation, they still need Members from five other Member States to reach the total of seven required. The Tories have remained tight-lipped about their prospective partners and the status of negotiations with them. The Polish Law & Justice Party are mooted as one partner but their highly socially conservative views sit awkwardly with Cameron's "compassionate conservatism." The Latvian Fatherland and Freedom Party is another possible ally, who portray Latvian members of the Waffen-SS as brave patriots defending against the greater evil of the Stalinist Soviet Union.

Indeed, several of the prospective partners seem to challenge the Tories' positioning as a modern, progressive party, and even in the event of forming a group, there are doubts as to its cohesion over a 5-year parliamentary term. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is apparently intent on persuading the Tories to re-join the fold in the EPP with a more "nation-statist" arm like the "ED" in the last Parliament. This would represent a major and embarrassing volte-face for Cameron. Yet there is little doubt that the Tories' path will now see them forego significant influence in the EPP Group as a whole and in senior Committee roles.

The face of the new Parliament

Political Group	Provisional Size	Dominant National Delegations (in order)	Number of Committee Chairs (2009/2004)		Out-going President	Future President
EPP-ED	264	Germany, Italy, France, Poland, Spain	9	9	Joseph Daul	Joseph Daul, election to be held?
PES	161	Germany, Spain, France, UK, Romania	6	7	Martin Schulz	Martin Schulz
ALDE	80	Germany, UK, Italy	3	3	Graham Watson	Guy Verhoofsadt (?), to be elected
UEN	Group to be disbanded	-	-	1	Brian Crowley, Cristiana Muscardini (joint)	-
New right grouping*	55 (?)	UK, Czech Republic...	2	-	-	Timothy Kirkhope (?)
Green/EFA	53	France, Germany, UK	1	1	Monica Frassoni, Daniel Cohn-Bendit (joint)	Daniel Cohn-Bendit
GUE/NGL	32	Germany, Portugal, Czech Republic	1	1	Francis Wurtz	?
IND/DEM	18	UK			Hanne Dhal, Nigel Farage (joint)	Nigel Farage
"Non-Attached"	38	-	-	-	-	-

* Current assumptions are that such a Group, if constructed, would have in the region of 55 MEPs.

** This assumes that 55 MEPs currently accounted for as "non-attached" in the provisional group configurations will sit in the "mainstream right-wing" group.

The political shape of the new Parliament & potential coalitions

The final political configuration of the Parliament is likely to unfold over the next five weeks prior to the Constitutive Session which begins on 13 July. Two critical unknowns could still impact the central balance of power of the Assembly.

1. The first is the destination of the Italian PD who will choose between sitting in the PES or the ALDE groups. If they opt for the former, the PES Group would grow to 183 Members. If they ally with the Liberals, this would grow ALDE to 102 Members. This may have an important bearing on the relative negotiating power of the two vis-à-vis the EPP Group for the initial political bargaining around the president of the Parliament and the nomination

vote for the incoming president-designate of the European Commission (see below).

The latest intelligence suggests that the PD will opt for the PES, though there is little indication as to the precise timing of a decision.

2. The second is the formation of a successor to the mainstream right-wing grouping of the Union of European Nations (UEN) by the UK Conservatives and the Czech Civic Democrats, together with members from five other Member States. To date, the putative Group is 34 Members-strong, but a working assumption is that it could add another 20 or so Members currently housed in the “non-attached” list.

President of the Parliament

The absence of a single dominant, “governing” party throughout the history of the directly elected Parliament means that formal and informal coalition-building has defined the workings of the Assembly in practice. The question at the start of each Parliament is what will be the shape of the formal coalition or agreement that will define who holds the two 2½-year terms as president. The 1999-2004 Parliament broke with a long held tradition of a “share-out” between the EPP and PES to institute a new EPP-ALDE arrangement. This reverted to an EPP-PES agreement from 2004-2009.

There are four potential political constellations, the first two seeming more plausible than the others:

1. EPP and PES – currently 425 votes
2. EPP, ALDE and new mainstream right-wing political group – approximately 390 votes (369 votes are required for an absolute majority in the new Parliament)
3. EPP, PES and ALDE – currently 505 votes
4. PES and ALDE – currently 241 votes (which would be boosted by the 22 Italian PD members) and would be contingent on a deal with the EPP over Barroso’s re-approval

Prior to the elections, there was an assumption that there would be a new EPP-PES agreement – scenario 1. This was based on an apparent pre-election agreement between the EPP and PES which would see PES Chairman, Martin Schulz, alongside one of the two EPP frontrunners - Jerzy Buzek and Mario Mauro - hold the two Presidential terms. Mr. Buzek, a former Polish prime minister, is considered the marginal favourite. He has the backing of the German and French EPP delegations and is probably strengthened by the strong performance and standing in the EPP of the Polish Civic Platform. Mr. Buzek’s election would also have strong symbolic value as he would be the first new Member State politician to hold a senior EU post. However, Mr. Mauro enjoys strong and likely vocal

support from Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, himself boosted by relative electoral success.

This scenario was based on a relatively similar proportion to the 2004 vote between the EPP and PES, possibly even with a gain by the PES. However, EPP leader Joseph Daul now finds himself under pressure from some parts of the EPP who would like him to capitalise on the EPP's much stronger electoral showing over the PES and look to a political agreement with the ALDE Group. Mr. Daul stated on the Monday after the election, "I do not rule out the possibility of an ALDE candidate sharing the presidency. I do not discount it." This would appear to boost the possibility of Graham Watson of the ALDE emerging as a candidate for presidency. An EPP-ALDE alliance would still need to accommodate a new mainstream right-wing political group and offer some sort of political incentives in the operation of the new Parliament.

One further factor might militate in this direction: the increasingly likely divergence of the German CDU-CSU and the SPD ahead of the German general election in September. The "Grand Coalition," formed in 2005, has had a significant influence on bipartisan behaviour in the EP. However, the EP election results themselves and the need for the two parties to campaign aggressively head-to-head over the next few months are likely to weaken the cooperative instinct between the CDU-CSU and the SPD and the EPP and PES more broadly.

Mr. Watson himself suggested that a PES-ALDE agreement could also not be ruled out, but the arithmetic works strongly against them, unless they could mobilise a grand coalition of the left. Such a PES-ALDE alliance could theoretically work as part of a wider bargain with the EPP to secure Barroso's re-election. However, this constellation seems unlikely given the different political strands in the respective PES and ALDE Groups.

There is little doubt that the EPP is in a strong bargaining position to determine its choice of suitor. Extracting the PES's reluctant backing to approve Mr. Barroso may prove a trade that the EPP can secure in return for a new EPP-PES deal on the Parliament's Presidency. This would have the added advantage of securing more than enough votes between the two Groups to avoid the EPP seeking a third suitor. The key question would then become what the PES would seek from Mr. Barroso policy-wise as part of this "grand bargain."

Approval of the European Commission President-designate

Prior to the election José Manuel Barroso was widely assumed to be the frontrunner for a second term. He had the backing of 13 heads of state and government, including the three Socialist prime ministers of the UK, Spain and Portugal. The Socialists themselves had failed to back an alternative candidate in the event they "won" the European elections or wanted to chance their arm at forming a grand coalition of the left. The Liberals have talked of fielding Guy Verhoofstadt, yet the former Belgian prime minister was opposed by more Eurosceptic Member States in June 2004, and it seems unlikely that they would

have the appetite to open old divisions with all the uncertainties of the Treaty of Lisbon and the economy hanging over them.

Mr. Barroso himself has carefully bided his time, only declaring his official candidacy after the election results were known and the centre-right bent of the new Parliament was confirmed. Interestingly, Mr. Barroso himself has talked of developing a 5-year political programme that aligns with the political thrust of the Parliament. An EPP-ALDE-new right grouping configuration would likely extract less political concessions than an approval dependent on EPP-PES support; the Socialists would seek much stronger commitments on the European social agenda.

The incoming Swedish Presidency is arguing forcefully for confirmation of Mr. Barroso's nomination during the 18-19 June European Council, to avoid a lame-duck Commission and tackle the pressing economic problems of the day. However, President Sarkozy is threatening to hold out until the October European Council, ostensibly as a bargaining chip to secure an influential portfolio in the new Commission. Most recently, former Socialist Spanish President Felipe Gonzalez has emerged as a possible candidate, floated in the name of Mr. Sarkozy.

Assuming that Mr. Barroso is re-nominated by the Member States, what are the prospects? The backing of 13 heads of state and government, especially the Socialist ones, does not necessarily equate to automatic support in the corresponding EP parties. The vote will be conducted on the basis of a secret ballot, freeing Members of party scrutiny. It seems reasonable to expect that known divisions in the UK, Spanish and Portuguese Socialist parties may translate into votes against. Equally there are misgivings in the ALDE membership about Mr. Barroso. What seems possible is that there will be a package deal on both the president of the Parliament and support for Mr. Barroso's re-approval. It is difficult to predict with any certainty at this stage whether this will be an EPP-PES or EPP-ALDE-right group coalition. The choice of the Italian PD and the fate of the right grouping, which would instinctively support Mr. Barroso, may yet prove significant in this respect.

The Committees

It is difficult to predict the actual allocation of key Committee positions ahead of the Constitutive Session in July. However, political negotiations at the end of the last Parliament appeared to agree on the status quo for the Committee structure for the 7th legislature. Discussions particularly focused around where to house "health" and "consumer protection" and indeed whether to consolidate them into a single Committee. Subject to final confirmation in the next few weeks, it seems highly probable that the Committees concerned will remain Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, as well as Internal Market and Consumer Protection.

Following the election, the D'Hondt system gives the following proportional Committee Chair allocations:

	2009	2004
EPP	9	9
PSE	6	7
ALDE	3	3
Greens/EFA	1	1
Right group/ UEN	2	1
GUE	1	1

This illustrates the EPP's additional influence in the Committee structures, which is reinforced by the D'Hondt-based "picks" system and will also give the EPP an advantage. For instance, this will impact the ALDE Group, whose first pick in the last Parliament was the fifth Committee to be chosen. They will have to wait until the sixth choice this time round.

The legislative *modus operandi* of the new Parliament: implications for business

Coalition- and consensus-building remain the principal rules of the game. It is often held that the dominant coalition tendency in the EP is EPP-PES. However, analysis of the last Parliamentary term shows that, in general terms, EPP-ALDE alliances often tended to form around issues that could broadly be defined as economic, while the PES and ALDE were more likely to rally around social, justice/home affairs and civil liberties issues. This thematic and issue-by-issue approach to coalition-building is likely to continue in the 7th legislature, with the EPP in a stronger negotiating position than in the last Parliament. Arguably, there is likely to be a marginally stronger overall pro-market bias with the EPP, ALDE and new mainstream right-wing political group (if formed) in this Parliament than the last. This should not be equated, however, with Anglo-Saxon liberalism, but rather with the specific social-market variant that characterises the centre-right in the Parliament. The final size and behaviour of the ALDE Group will have an important bearing on the predictability of this "economic" coalition.

Equally, the behaviour of PES, ALDE and the newly buoyed Greens is likely to have a significant bearing on environmental issues. The Greens' political support and the increasing relevance of environmental/climate change issues to the European public means that the Greens will continue to punch above their weight in debates, even if they are numerically dependent on a left-leaning coalition for legislative success. Interestingly, the fairly strong green discourse of David Cameron is likely to weigh on the new right grouping and test the cohesiveness of

its likely Central European partners, who are less inclined to support strong environmental legislation.

Environmental regulation and policy is likely to occupy a significant amount of Parliamentary time. The Parliament is likely to continue to be more environmentally conscious than the Member States in the Council and to remain the key “target” of the Commission and external stakeholders in building political support for strong environmental legislation.

Overall, business can broadly expect a continuation of the Parliament’s regulatory behaviour from the last Parliament. The reinforced mainstream right may provide a slightly stronger resistance against the more regulatory and socially protective tendencies of the centre-left, particularly in the current economic environment, but the Parliament’s position as “friend of the environment and the consumer” is likely to persist. The eventual political alignment between the incoming Commission president and the Parliamentary coalition that backs him may well go some way to determine whether the 7th legislature is more social market or more social democrat-oriented. A right-leaning coalition would probably see Mr. Barroso steer a similar political course; a deal to secure PES support for Mr. Barroso’s re-selection would likely see him steer a more socially-oriented course as the Socialists have increasingly agitated for over the last few years.

What next?

All roads lead to the Constitutive Session starting on 13 July. Between now and then intra- and inter-Political Group negotiations will determine:

- The “arrangement” for the two 2½-year terms of the Parliament’s president
- The nominations for the Parliament vice presidents and quaestors
- The committee chairs, vice-chairs and political group coordinators for 20 committees and two sub-committees
- The coalitions that will back and oppose likely EC President-designate Barroso at his approval vote

Members will also give their Committee (Member and Substitute) preferences for the Parliamentary Committees.

Provisional Political Group numbers by Member State: 2009 versus 2004 – as of 11 June 2009

Member States	EPP/ED		PES		ALDE		GREENS/EFA		UEN		GUE /NGL		IND DEM		NI	
	2009	2004	2009	2004	2009	2004	2009	2004	2009	2004	2009	2004	2009	2004	2009	2004
Austria	6	6	4	7	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	3
Belgium	6	6	5	7	5	6	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Bulgaria	6	5	4	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
Czech Republic	2	14	7	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	0	0	9	1
Cyprus	2	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	1	0
Denmark	1	1	4	5	3	4	2	1	2	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
Estonia	1	1	1	3	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Finland	4	4	2	3	4	5	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
France	29	17	14	31	6	11	14	6	0	0	4	3	1	3	4	0
Germany	42	49	23	23	12	7	14	13	0	0	8	7	0	0	0	0
Greece	8	11	8	8	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	4	2	1	0	0
Hungary	15	13	4	9	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Italy	35	24	0	16	7	12	0	2	9	9	0	7	0	4	21	0
Ireland	4	5	3	1	1	1	0	0	3	4	0	1	0	1	0	0
Latvia	1	3	0	0	1	1	1	1	3	4	0	0	0	0	1	0
Lithuania	4	2	3	2	2	7	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0
Luxembourg	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	2	2	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	5	7	3	7	6	5	3	4	0	0	2	2	2	2	4	0
Poland	28	19	7	8	0	4	0	0	15	7	0	0	0	10	0	6
Portugal	10	9	7	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	3	0	0	0	0
Romania	13	15	11	10	5	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4
Slovakia	6	8	5	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
Slovenia	3	4	2	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	23	24	21	24	2	2	2	3	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0
Sweden	5	5	5	5	4	3	2	1	0	0	1	2	0	3	1	0
United Kingdom	0	28	13	19	11	12	5	5	0	0	1	1	13	11	29	2
EU-27	264	288	161	217	80	100	53	43	35	44	32	41	18	22	93	30

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